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Abstract
Adversarial robustness has proven to be a required
property of machine learning algorithms. A key
and often overlooked aspect of this problem is
to try to make the adversarial noise magnitude
as large as possible to enhance the benefits of
the model robustness. We show that the well-
established algorithm called “adversarial training”
fails to train a deep neural network given a large,
but reasonable, perturbation magnitude. In this
paper, we propose a simple yet effective initializa-
tion of the network weights that makes learning on
higher levels of noise possible. We next evaluate
this idea rigorously on MNIST ( up to ≈ 0.40)
and CIFAR10 ( up to ≈ 32/255) datasets assum-
ing the `∞ attack model. Additionally, in order
to establish the limits of  in which the learning
is feasible, we study the optimal robust classifier
assuming full access to the joint data and label
distribution. Then, we provide some theoretical
results on the adversarial accuracy for a simple
multi-dimensional Bernoulli distribution, which
yields some insights on the range of feasible per-
turbations for the MNIST dataset.
1. Introduction
Modern machine learning models achieve high accuracy
on different tasks such as image classification (He et al.,
2015a) and speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013; Xiong
et al., 2016). However, they are not robust to adversarially
chosen small perturbations of their inputs. In particular,
one can make imperceptible perturbations of the input data,
which can cause state-of-the-art models to misclassify their
inputs with high confidence (Biggio et al., 2017; Carlini &
Wagner, 2018; Carlini et al., 2016; Szegedy et al., 2014).
Also, researchers have shown that even in the physical world
scenarios, machine learning models are vulnerable to adver-
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sarial examples (Kurakin et al., 2016b; Li et al., 2019). The
robustness properties of the models in machine learning are
a huge concern, as they have been increasingly employed
in applications in which safety and security are among the
principal issues. Furthermore, the benefits of a robust model
go beyond this; for instance, significantly improved model
interpretability (Tsipras et al., 2018) and effective exclusion
of brittle features in the learned robust model (Ilyas et al.,
2019) are some of the model robustness benefits. The former
could be observed through an input-dependent saliency map,
which is usually a variant of the model gradient with respect
to the input, and the fact that this map becomes sparser and
semantically more relevant compared to that of a non-robust
model. An example of the latter is the ability of the robust
model to avoid “shortcut features” that are logically irrele-
vant but may be strongly correlated to the class. Learning
under an adversarial noise would help in obscuring such
features and make the model rely on alternative aspects of
the input that are more robust for label prediction.
The phenomenon of adversarial machine learning has re-
ceived significant attention in recent years and several meth-
ods have been proposed for training a robust classifier on
images. However, most of these methods have been shown
to be ineffective (Athalye & Carlini, 2018; Athalye et al.,
2018; Carlini, 2019; Carlini & Wagner, 2016; 2017), while
many others are shown to lack scalability to large networks
that are expressive enough to solve problems like ImageNet
(Cohen et al., 2019). To the best of our knowledge, only
two training algorithms and their variants, which are called
“adversarial training” (Madry et al., 2017) and “randomized
smoothing” (Cohen et al., 2019), have been confirmed to
be both effective and scalable. Nevertheless, adversarial
training remains ineffective for large perturbations of the
input (Sharma & Chen, 2018). More specifically, the au-
thors observed that the adversarial training does not yield
an accuracy better than random guessing for perturbation
`∞ norm, denoted as epsilon, larger than or equal to 0.4 in
the MNIST dataset. Training in the presence of large pertur-
bations, however, is essential to advance the level of model
robustness and its benefits that are gained as a result. For
instance, if the model is robust to perturbations of `0 norm
less than m, then only “shortcut features” that are captured
in m pixels could be avoided. Otherwise, we would need a
larger m to take the best advantage of the model robustness.
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In addition to the mentioned robust training algorithms,
some prior work was also aimed at studying adversarial ma-
chine learning from a more theoretical perspective (Attias
et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2020; Cullina et al., 2018; Diochnos
et al., 2019; Gilmer et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2019; Khim
& Loh, 2018; Montasser et al., 2019; Schmidt et al., 2018;
Wang et al., 2017; Yin et al., 2018; Zhai et al., 2019; Zhang
et al., 2019). However, to our understanding, none of them
claim to find the optimal robust classifier, assuming knowl-
edge of joint data and label distribution, except only under
a strong assumption on the hypothesis space (Ilyas et al.,
2019). This helps to find a limit on the perturbation size
until we could expect to get a better-than-random classifier
assuming sufficiently large training set.
In section 3, we demonstrate that weight initialization of
a deep neural network plays an important role in the feasi-
bility of adversarial training of the network under a large
perturbation size. A natural question that arises is:
How much can we increase the perturbation `p-norm during
the training?
To answer this question, we study the optimal robust classi-
fier, where we have the full knowledge of the input distribu-
tion given different classes. In section 5, we first prove that,
in general, finding the optimal robust classifier in this set-
ting isNP-hard. Therefore, we focus our attention on some
conditional distributions, such as the symmetric isotropic
Normal and multi-dimensional Bernoulli distributions, in
which finding the optimal robust classifier is tractable. Next,
we discuss the limits on the perturbation size under which
the optimal robust classifier has a better-than-chance adver-
sarial accuracy.
In addition, in section 4, following (Tsipras et al., 2018) and
(Kaur et al., 2019), we show that our models that are trained
on larger perturbation sizes have more interpretable saliency
maps and attacks, and some other notable visual properties.
These results also suggest that using our proposed method
to train the model adversarially on a larger perturbation size
boosts the benefits that are gained in the robust models.
2. Related Work
Adversarial machine learning has been studied since two
decades ago (Dalvi et al., 2004; Globerson & Roweis, 2006;
Kolcz & Teo, 2009). But (Szegedy et al., 2013) and (Biggio
et al., 2017) could be considered as the starting point of
significant attention to this field, especially in the context
of deep learning. Since then, many ideas have emerged
that are intended to make the classification robust against
adversarial perturbations. However, most of them have later
been shown to be ineffective. Gradient masking (Papernot
et al., 2016) is an example of issues that arise from such
ideas, which leads to a false sense of security. In particular,
obfuscated gradients (Athalye et al., 2018) could make it
impossible for the gradient-based adversaries to attack the
model. Subsequently, these defenses are easily broken by
alternative adversaries, such as non-gradient based (Chen
et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018; Uesato et al., 2018), or black-
box attacks (Papernot et al., 2016). This shows that evaluat-
ing the robustness of a neural network is a challenging task.
In addition to these unsuccessful attempts, many others are
not scalable to large networks that are expressive enough for
the classification task on ImageNet and sometimes need to
assume specific network architectures (Cohen et al., 2019).
“Adversarial training” is among the most established meth-
ods in the field, which was introduced in (Goodfellow et al.,
2014; Kurakin et al., 2016a) and was completed later by
(Madry et al., 2017) through the lens of robust optimiza-
tion (Ben-Tal et al., 2009). Following this work, there have
been numerous studies to improve the adversarial accu-
racy of adversarial training on the test set by using tech-
niques such as domain adaptation (Song et al., 2018) or label
smoothing (Shafahi et al., 2018), while some others have
tried to decrease the computational cost of adversarial train-
ing (Shafahi et al., 2019; Wong et al., 2020). Researchers
have also tried to apply adversarial training on more natural
classes of perturbations such as translations and rotations for
images (Engstrom et al., 2017), or on the mixture of pertur-
bations (Maini et al., 2019; Tramer & Boneh, 2019). Also,
(Ford et al., 2019) showed the relation between adversarial
training and Gaussian data augmentation.
3. Proposed Method
Recall that in adversarial training (Madry et al., 2017), we
need to solve the adversarial empirical risk minimization
problem, which is a saddle point problem, that is formulated
as:
min
θ
n∑
i=1
max
δ∈S
`(fθ(xi + δ), yi) (1)
where S represents the set of feasible adversarial perturba-
tions, and ` is the loss function. The inner maximization
is referred to as the “adversarial loss”. The setting that we
study in this section is when
S = {δ ∈ Rd : ‖δ‖∞ ≤ },  > 0, (2)
which is the most common perturbation set and used by
(Madry et al., 2017) and is also considered as the standard
benchmark in the context of adversarial examples.
To motivate the proposed method, we would begin with
the result of an experiment. We observe that adversarial
training on larger epsilons can not decrease the adversarial
loss sufficiently, even on the training data. The training
adversarial loss for different values of epsilons is provided
both on MNIST (Fig. 1) and CIFAR10 (Supplementary Fig.
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9 in Sec. D). The detailed experiments are provided in 3.1.
This observation would raise the following question:
Is this an optimization issue in a highly non-convex non-
concave min-max game; or is it just that learning is not
feasible on large epsilons?
Before answering this question, one should note that opti-
mization in deep learning has not been extensively studied
from a theoretical perspective. Specifically, it is not even
completely known why one could achieve near-zero train-
ing loss in standard training through randomly initialized
gradient descent. This is especially surprising given the
highly non-convex loss landscape. Yet the gradient descent
is guaranteed to converge in this setting. However, we do
not even have this convergence guarantee for adversarial
training as a gradient descent-ascent algorithm on the highly
non-convex non-concave min-max game (Scha¨fer & Anand-
kumar, 2019).
Nevertheless, in practice, researchers observed that the train-
ability of deep models is highly dependent on weight initial-
ization, model architecture, the choice of optimizer, and a
variety of other considerations (Li et al., 2017). The effect
of different initializations on adversarial training has not
been studied rigorously in the literature (Ben Daya et al.,
2018; Simon-Gabriel et al., 2018).
Our main contribution is to propose a novel practical initial-
ization for the adversarial training, which makes learning
on larger perturbations feasible. Specifically, for adversar-
ial training on large perturbations, we claim that the final
weights of an adversarially trained network on a smaller ep-
silon can be used for this purpose. Surprisingly, this method
can find a good solution for larger perturbations even with a
few numbers of training epochs. Fig. 2 depicts the above-
mentioned idea by illustrating a significant decrease in the
training loss for large epsilons using the proposed initializa-
tion, which was not possible using a random initialization.
This is illustrated in various settings of initial and target ep-
silons for the MNIST and CIFAR10 datasets. The detailed
experiments are provided in 3.1.
To gain more insights on the proposed method, we would
address these questions:
1. Does adversarial training converge when we train on
larger perturbations?
2. Why the low-cost local Nash equilibrium that is found
by our method cannot be reached using random initial-
ization?
3. Why does the proposed initialization converge quickly
with few numbers of training epochs?
Towards addressing all these questions, in 3.2, we employ
the “loss landscape model”, which gives a geometric intu-
ition about the loss function.
In 3.3, we first evaluate our method rigorously and then
we discuss another surprising observation, which is the
trainability of deep models on very large perturbations (e.g.
 ≥ 0.5 on MNIST, where the pixel intensities are scaled
between 0 and 1), which obviously should not be possible,
because the attacker can ideally transform all the pixel in-
tensities to a single level and as a result, we should not be
able to do better than random guessing.
In the last section 3.4, we introduce “iterative adversarial
training”, that gradually increases the value of epsilon dur-
ing the training procedure, as a possible alternative to the
proposed weight initialization.
3.1. Method Evaluation
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed weight ini-
tialization on the adversarial trainability of deep models on
larger epsilons, we run several experiments on the MNIST
(LeCun & Cortes, 2010) and CIFAR10 (Krizhevsky et al.)
datasets.
3.1.1. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
• Model architecture: For MNIST, we use a convolu-
tional neural network architecture (Lecun & Bengio,
1995) that is obtained from the TensorFlow tutorial
(Hope et al., 2017) and for CIFAR10, we use standard
ResNet-50 architecture (He et al., 2015b).
• Base model training: For training the MNIST models,
we scale the pixel intensities between 0 and 1. For the
optimization, we use the cross-entropy loss, Adam
optimizer (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with learning rate =
0.001 and batch size = 128. In standard training, we
use only 5 epochs. For adversarial training, we used
30 epochs, signed Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)
attack (Madry et al., 2017) with the random start, PGD
learning rate = 0.05 and number of steps = epsilon×2.5
/ PGD learning rate. For CIFAR10, we scale the pixel
intensities between 0 and 1. For the optimization, we
also use the cross-entropy loss, SGD optimizer with
the learning rate schedule being 0.1 for the first 50
epochs, 0.01 for the second 50, and 0.001 for the third
50, all of them with the weight decay = 5×10−4, batch
size = 128 and also data augmentation. Specifically,
for adversarial training, we train for 150 epochs, based
on signed PGD with the random start, learning rate =
2/255 and steps = epsilon×2.5 / PGD learning rate.
Note that many of these settings are obtained from
(Engstrom et al., 2019b).
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Figure 1. Training adversarial loss against the epoch number for
various epsilons in the MNIST dataset. Adversarial training fails
to decrease the training adversarial loss on epsilons greater than
≈ 0.35.
• Proposed method setup, which we call as “Extended
adversarial training”: For both MNIST and CIFAR10,
we trained our models 5 epochs with the new larger
epsilons with the same exact setting as the ones in the
base model training, except that for CIFAR10, we do
not use data augmentation.
3.1.2. EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1: When we try to apply adversarial training on
large epsilons, the training loss does not decrease. We show
the training adversarial loss across different epsilons on both
MNIST (Fig. 1) and CIFAR10 (Supplementary Fig. 9 in Sec.
D). We also try to adversarially train the models by adopting
different choices of architectures, optimizers, learning rates,
weight initialization, and different settings of PGD. These
are described in more detail in the Supplementary Materials
B.
Conclusion: Overall, it seems that these modifications are
not playing a major role in the adversarial trainability of
deep models on large epsilons.
Experiment 2: We take the weights from an adversarially
trained model on epsilon = 0.3 in MNIST and epsilon =
8/255 in CIFAR10 as the initial weights, followed by ad-
versarial training on larger epsilons. We report the results in
Fig. 2.
Conclusion: This initialization makes the adversarial learn-
ing possible on larger epsilons in both datasets.
C D
BA
Figure 2. Using the new weight initialization based on an already
adversarially trained model on a smaller epsilon makes training on
larger epsilons possible. Training from epsilon = 0.3 to 0.4 (A),
epsilon = 0.35 to 0.45 (B), both on MNIST. Training from epsilon
= 8/255 to 16/255 (C), and epsilon = 8/255 to 32/255 (D) both
on CIFAR10.
Remark 1: Initializations based on the standard trained
models are also observed to be ineffective in this context,
which suggests that weights of an adversarially trained
model are inherently different from a standard trained model
(Goodfellow et al., 2014).
3.1.3. RESULTS
Now we compare the accuracy of our trained models with
standard benchmarks in the literature (see Tables 1 and 2).
We compared the results to a baseline, namely the model
that is trained by the adversarial training with the commonly
used epsilons in the literature. Note that one should not
expect a model that is trained on a given perturbation size
to resist attacks of larger magnitudes. However, this could
serve as a simple baseline and give a sense of the adversarial
accuracy that is gained through the proposed method. We
observe that using our proposed method, we could make
adversarial training on larger epsilons feasible and achieve
non-trivial and significant adversarial test accuracies. We
evaluate all models robustness against the signed PGD at-
tack with 200 steps, and the other hyper-parameters stay
unchanged compared to what we used for training. For the
reasons that become clear later in 3.3, the PGD that is used
to solve the inner maximization has a larger step size and
smaller learning rate compared to the previously mentioned
PGD in 3.1.1. It is worth noting that we did not try to
fine-tune any of these models to improve the accuracy.
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Figure 3. `(α), the interpolated loss function, begins to be non-
convex along the direction connecting the initial random to the
final trained weights. The plot is made based on 200 points along
the horizontal axis. The loss is calculated on a batch of size 512 of
the training data. (A) refers to the standard training, while (B), (C),
and (D) correspond to epsilon = 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4, respectively.
Remark: The adversarial accuracy under the attacks with
bounded `2 norm are observed to improve in the model that
is trained by the proposed idea. More specifically, we con-
sider the evaluation based on a PGD attack with epsilon = 5,
learning rate = 0.1, and 125 steps. In the MNIST dataset,
we obtain an adversarial test accuracy of ≈ 60% for the
model that is trained with epsilon = 0.4, compared to 30%
for the model that is trained with the original adversarial
training with epsilon = 0.3.
Table 1. Test accuracies of the proposed methods on MNIST com-
pared to that of the Adversarial Training.
MODEL CLEAN ACCURACY  = 0.3  = 0.4
 = 0.3→ 0.4 98% 94% 90%
IAT ( = 0→ 0.4) (SEE 3.4) 98% 95% 91%
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ( = 0.3) 98% 91% 15%
(MADRY ET AL., 2017)
Table 2. Test accuracies of the proposed methods on CIFAR10
compared to that of the Adversarial Training.
MODEL CLEAN ACCURACY  = 8
255
 = 16
255
 = 32
255
 = 8/255→ 16/255 75% 56% 32% 10%
 = 8/255→ 32/255 33% 28% 24% 16%
ADVERSARIAL TRAINING ( = 8/255) 87% 53% 18% 1%
(ENGSTROM ET AL., 2019B)
3.2. Insights on the proposed method
In this section, we address the three questions that were
raised earlier in this section. In the deep learning literature,
researchers have used loss function visualization to gain
insights about the training of deep models, which could
Figure 4. Left: When initialized on weights of an already adver-
sarially trained model with epsilon = 0.3, `(α) could be better
approximated by a convex function. Right: `(α) based on the
initial epsilon stays low as we progress from the initial to the final
weights, which implies that the training is focused on low-cost
solutions for the initial epsilon (weights that are robust against the
initial epsilon) along this line segment.
not be theoretically explained. Several methods have been
proposed for this purpose (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Li et al.,
2017). We further use some visualization to address these
questions.
Visualization 1: To assess the convergence of adversarial
training, we used two different plots. Specifically, the differ-
ence between training adversarial loss, and the `2 distance
of weights in two consecutive epochs empirically indicate
the convergence. The plots are shown in the Supplementary
Materials E.
Conclusion: It seems that according to both mentioned
plots, the adversarial training empirically has reached a
local Nash equilibrium. This result is not unexpected as it
has previously been shown that adversarial training would
converge irrespective of the epsilon value in a simple model
setting (Gao et al., 2019).
Visualization 2: (Goodfellow et al., 2015) proposed a
method for loss landscape visualization. Specifically, the
adversarial loss function denoted as `(θ), is considered for
the weights θ lying on the line segment that is connecting
θ0 to θ1, where θ0 is the initial network weights and θ1 is
the final trained weights. `(θ) could be parametrized by α,
where θ = (1− α)θ0 + αθ1, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
Conclusion:
• We assume that the network initial weights are random.
`(α) is convex for small perturbations but begins to be
non-convex as epsilon grows (Fig. 3). Therefore, the
weights associated with low adversarial loss may not be
easily reachable from a random initialization through
gradient-based optimization for a large epsilon.
• Now, assume that the initial weights are obtained from
an adversarially trained model. The `(α) seems to be
well approximated by a convex function (Fig. 4; Left).
Therefore, solutions with low training adversarial loss
become reachable from the initial weights.
Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Large Perturbations
Visualization 3: Mode connectivity (Dra¨xler et al., 2018;
Freeman & Bruna, 2016; Garipov et al., 2018) is an un-
expected phenomenon in the loss landscape of deep nets.
There have been some efforts in the literature to give a the-
oretical explanation of this effect (Kuditipudi et al., 2019).
We made a similar plot to the visualization 2, with the dif-
ference that training adversarial loss is calculated according
to the initial epsilon (Fig. 4; Right).
Conclusion: The given plot suggests that the proposed
initialization makes the adversarial training focused on a
small weight subspace. Because the training adversarial
loss, when evaluated based on the initial epsilon, does not
increase, and even decreases slightly. Therefore, we are ex-
ploring the weights that are robust against the initial epsilon
as opposed to the entire weight space. This suggests “mode
connectivity” in our training and therefore, we could expect
the optimization to converge quickly.
3.3. Evaluating adversarial robustness
As already mentioned, evaluating against the adversarial
attacks has proven to be extremely tricky. Here, we are
inspired by the latest recommendations on evaluating adver-
sarial robustness (Carlini et al., 2019). Note that our threat
model is simple, and is indeed similar to the one that is used
in the evaluation of adversarial training. Motivated by the re-
cently recommended checklist for evaluation of adversarial
robustness, we applied various sanity checks such as black-
box attacks (Papernot et al., 2016), gradient-free (Chen et al.,
2017), brute force attacks, and a novel semi-black-box at-
tack to make the threat model broader. We found out that
the proposed defenses pass all these checklists on MNIST.
The details of the evaluation setup and the results for these
experiments are explained in the Supplementary Materials
C.
Building upon the mentioned recommendation list, we fur-
ther evaluated our models based on more challenging tests.
These are designed to increase our confidence in the claims
that we make about the model robustness that is achieved
by the proposed method.
We first decrease the learning rate of PGD to 0.01 and in-
creased the number of steps to 1000 to find a stronger attack.
In the model that is trained based on our proposed initial-
ization with target epsilon = 0.5, this led to adversarial
accuracy of 30%, as opposed to 80% that is obtained when
the same PGD as in the training is used for the test-time
attack. However, the mentioned stronger attack does not
significantly affect the adversarial accuracy of the model
with target epsilon = 0.4. To make the attack even stronger
we used the actual gradient, as opposed to the signed gra-
dient in PGD (Madry et al., 2017), with the learning rate
= 5× 104 and step number = 2000. We observed that the
adversarial accuracy dropped to 14% - 20% for the former
Loss
Figure 5. The loss function is visualized along the random and
adversarial directions on a test data point. (A): The plots for the
MNIST data, for epsilon = 0.3, 0.4, and 0.5 from left to right.
The models do not show significant signs of gradient obfuscation,
which is a sudden jump or non-smoothness of the loss, for epsilon
up to around 0.4. (B): In CIFAR10, the plots are made for models
that are trained with epsilons 16/255, 32/255, 64/255 from left
to right. We do not observe gradient obfuscation up until 64/255.
For MNIST, we used 104 points on the horizontal plane and we
considered half of the corresponding epsilon along both directions.
For CIFAR10, we used 502 points and considered epsilon along
both directions. Note that, in the MNIST dataset, the “clean” loss
landscape is not observed on all test samples even in the original
adversarial training. However, for the majority of such samples,
we get the desired loss landscape.
model, but this again did not affect adversarial accuracy of
the model with target epsilon = 0.4. Notably, we could not
decrease validation adversarial accuracy of the model with
the target epsilon = 0.4 although we tried out various PGD
settings.
One could use the loss function visualization along the ad-
versarial and random direction in the input space to assess
the gradient obfuscation. This plot suggests that the model
with the target epsilon = 0.4 does not exhibit gradient obfus-
cation, while the model with epsilon = 0.5 shows signs of
gradient obfuscation (Fig. 5).
To go further, we used the PGD with learning rate = 0.005
and 200 steps for the inner maximization in adversarial
training from epsilon = 0.3 to target epsilon = 0.5. We
noted that the adversarial training loss increased in the final
model from 0.6 to 1.2, and test adversarial accuracy based
on the same PGD decreased significantly from 80% to 30%.
Surprisingly, unlike the model that is trained with a weaker
PGD, we could successfully attack the trained model with
the stronger PGD even with the weaker attack that was
introduced in 3.1.1.
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Figure 6. (A): Two test samples from MNIST. (B) The loss gradient (saliency map) with respect to the perturbed input (of epsilon = 0.3)
that is obtained for the model trained on epsilon = 0.3 (Right) and the model that is trained on epsilon from 0.3 to 0.4 (Left). (C) The
perturbation (of size epsilon = 0.45) for the corresponding models in (B). (D) Left: the original image. Right: the perturbations that are
obtained from the model trained on epsilon from 0.3 to 0.5, based on the attack obtained from the actual gradient that is mentioned in
Sec. 3.3. We note that the attack that is based on the actual gradient exhibits better interpretability even in the model trained with the
original adversarial training. Recall that this model shows obvious signs of gradient obfuscation. Note that we did not apply random
restart in any of these plots, and the images are scaled for visualization purposes. Overall, training on larger perturbations leads to stronger
interpretability of both the model and the attacks.
This is analogous to the remedy that is used to avoid gradient
obfuscation in FGSM by increasing the number of steps,
which led to emergence of the PGD attack. Indeed, the first
attempt to train the model using a PGD with a small number
of steps has overfitted to this weak attack. We believe that
by making the inner maximization more accurate, one could
not even be able to train a model at epsilon = 0.5.
Note that for CIFAR10, as the adversarial accuracy is al-
ready low for large epsilons, we do not need to evaluate
the model on the stronger attack. We included the gradient
obfuscation plots for CIFAR10 in Fig. 5, which shows a
similar trend to those of MNIST.
3.4. Iterative adversarial training (IAT)
Inspired by previously suggested “extended model train-
ing”, we propose a new method, which we call “Iterative
Adversarial Training” (IAT). In IAT, the epsilon is gradu-
ally increased from 0 to the target epsilon with a specific
schedule across epochs during the training.
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Figure 7. Training adversarial loss against the number of epochs
for the proposed iterative adversarial training (IAT) algorithm on
MNIST.
For the MNIST dataset, we used the same model as de-
scribed earlier. The only difference here is that we increase
epsilon by 0.01 in each epoch of adversarial training. In
addition, we could identify the stopping point for epsilon by
plotting the training adversarial loss against epochs and stop
as soon as a significant sudden increase is observed (Fig. 7).
For the CIFAR10 dataset, we tested several schedules (e.g.
linear and exponential schedules) with different settings, but
unfortunately, the trained models either did not show a good
adversarial accuracy or got overfitted.
4. Benefits of Adversarial Robustness
The interpretability of the machine learning models has
emerged as an essential property of the model in many real-
world applications. These, include areas where an explana-
tion on the model prediction is required for either validation
or providing overlooked insights about the input-output as-
sociation to a human user. In addition to the recent efforts
to understand the internal logic of these models (Montavon
et al., 2015; Selvaraju et al., 2016), it has been observed that
interpretability comes as an unexpected benefit of adversar-
ial robustness. For instance, the saliency map that highlights
influential portions of the input becomes sparser and more
meaningful in the robust models (Tsipras et al., 2018).
The last layer of a deep neural network can be thought of
as the representation that is learned by the model. This
representation could be divided into a set of robust and non-
robust features (Ilyas et al., 2019). Robust features are the
ones that are highly correlated to the class label even in
the presence of adversarial perturbations. These features,
therefore, have a close relation to the human perception and
changes in these features can affect the meaning of data for a
Towards Deep Learning Models Resistant to Large Perturbations
human being. In contrast, non-robust features show a brittle
correlation to the class label and therefore are not aligned
with the human perception. During the training process,
a network has a bias towards learning non-robust features
(Engstrom et al., 2019a; Ilyas et al., 2019). Adversarial
training is a natural remedy that prevents the network from
learning and relying on non-robust features. By training a
network on lager perturbations, we narrow the set of non-
robust features that classifier can learn and as a result, the
loss gradient with respect to the input relies on more robust
features and become more interpretable. Therefore, we
would expect more relevant saliency maps for such a model.
Next, we assess this property in our learned models and
compare them to models that are robust to smaller perturba-
tions (Fig 6). Specifically, we observe that the saliency map
that is obtained from the loss gradient with respect to the
input, evaluated on the perturbed data, in the model trained
on larger epsilon, becomes more compact and concentrated
around the foreground. Relevant to this, we also plotted
the adversarial perturbation on the model that is trained on
the MNIST dataset with epsilon = 0.4 and compared it to a
network that is trained on epsilon = 0.3. The PGD attack
is based on epsilon = 0.45. We observe that the attack on
both models has aimed to obscure the digit, but the attack
from the model with higher epsilon would erase the digit
more precisely. It has been reported that the attack on adver-
sarially trained models lacks interpretability (Schott et al.,
2018; Sharma & Chen, 2018), however, our model appears
to yield more interpretable attacks compared to the baseline.
5. Theoretical Results
We first briefly recap the definition of classification error
rate and classification adversarial error rate and then, we de-
fine 1. optimal classifier, 2. (p, )−optimal robust classifier,
3. optimal classification error rate and 4. (p, )−optimal
classification error rate with respect to the given distribu-
tion. Next, we discuss such optimal classifiers and their
corresponding error rates under two specific distributions.
5.1. Basics and definitions
In the subsequent definitions, we let L = {1, 2, . . . , c} be
the set of labels. We also, let D : Rd × L→ R denote the
joint feature and label distribution.
Definition 1. The error rate of a classifier h : Rd → L on
the distribution D is defined as:
R(h,D) := Ex,y ∼ D {I(h(x) 6= y)} , (3)
where I(.) is the indicator function that takes 1 if its input
is a true logical statement, and 0 otherwise.
Definition 2. The classifier h : Rd → L is said to be an
optimal classifier on D if for any other classifier h′ : Rd →
L,R(h,D) ≤ R(h′, D). R(h,D) is also called the optimal
Bayes classification error rate on D.
Definition 3. Let x ∈ Rd be a point in the input space. Let
p,  ∈ R+. Then, the perturbation set Bp(x) is defined as:
Bp(x) :=
{
x′ ∈ Rd : ‖x− x′‖p ≤ 
}
, (4)
where ‖.‖p is the `p norm of a vector.
Definition 4. Let Bp(x) be a perturbation set. Then, ad-
versarial error rate of a classifier h : Rd → L on the
perturbation set Bp(x) and the distribution D is defined as:
R(adv)p, (h,D) := Ex,y ∼ D
{
I(∃δ ∈ Bp : h(x+ δ) 6= y)
}
.
(5)
Definition 5. The classifier h : Rd → L is said to be
a (p, )-optimal robust classifier on D if for any other
classifier h′ : Rd → L, R(adv)p, (h,D) ≤ R(adv)p, (h′, D).
R
(adv)
p, (h,D) is also called the (p, )-optimal classification
error rate on D.
As the optimal and the optimal robust classifiers tend to
solve completely different problems by the definition, they
can be different functions for a given distribution. One
can easily show that they can be different functions in the
general case. Consider a very simple distribution on X ⊂
Rd and L = {1,−1}, which contains just two points x1
and x2, D(x1, 1) = D(x2,−1) = 1/2. Assume that ‖x1 −
x2‖p ≤ . The optimal classifier outputs 1 and−1, when the
input is x1 and x2, respectively. However, the (p, )-optimal
robust classifier outputs a constant, either 1 or −1.
5.2. Optimal classifiers
In the standard setting, we can find the optimal classifier for
a given distribution by assuming full access to the joint data
and label distribution efficiently, specifically, through ap-
plying the Bayes optimal classifier theorem (Devroye et al.,
1997). However, the problem of finding the (p, )−optimal
robust classifier in this setting is computationally hard in
general.
Theorem 1. The problem of finding the optimal robust clas-
sifier given the joint data and label distribution D(x, y) for
the perturbations as large as  in `p norm, is an NP-hard
problem.
It was shown that adversarial robustness might come at the
cost of higher training time (Madry et al., 2017), requiring
more data (Schmidt et al., 2018), and losing the standard
accuracy (Tsipras et al., 2018). In addition, we show that
finding the optimal robust classifier is an NP-hard prob-
lem. Note that this computational difficulty is different from
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the ones that arise in finding the global minimum of a non-
convex function. Because by assuming an infinite amount of
training data, instead of minimizing the non-convex empiri-
cal loss, we can well approximate the data distribution and
therefore, we can efficiently find an optimal Bayes classifier.
However, in this case, finding an optimal robust classifier is
still computational prohibitive in the general case.
We note that for several distributions, one could efficiently
find the optimal robust classifier. These include the Gaussian
and mixture of Bernoulli distributions.
5.3. The Isotropic Gaussian model
Definition 6. Isotropic Gaussian class conditional distri-
butions: We first sample y ∈ {−1, 1} uniformly and then
sample a data point in Rd from a multivariate Gaussian
distribution N(µy, σ2I), where without loss of generality
µ1 = −µ−1.
Theorem 2. Let (x|y) ∼ N(µy, σ2I), and y ∈ {−1, 1}
with equal probabilities, then assuming that the (2, )-
optimal robust classifier has a continuous decision bound-
ary, f(x) = 2I(w>x ≥ 0) − 1 is (2, )-robust , where
w = µ1 − µ−1. Furthermore, the optimal Bayes and opti-
mal robust classification error rates are Φ
(
−‖µ1−µ−1‖2
2σ
)
,
and Φ
(
−‖µ1−µ−1‖2+2
2σ
)
, respectively, where Φ is the cu-
mulative distribution function for the standard normal dis-
tribution.
5.4. The multi-dimensional Bernoulli model
Definition 7. Uniform mixture of two multivariate Bernoulli
distributions, Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t): Let θ(1)i and
θ
(−1)
i ∈ {−1, 1} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d, and t ∈ R+. We
first randomly sample the class label y uniformly from
{−1, 1}. Then, we sample each dimension of x according
to a Bernoulli distribution:
xi =
{
θ
(y)
i , with probability 1/2 + t
−θ(y)i , with probability 1/2− t
(6)
Therefore, the conditional distribution of x given y becomes:
D(x|y) = (1/2 + t)d−‖x−θ(y)‖0(1/2− t)‖x−θ(y)‖0 (7)
Theorem 3. Let Bernoulli (θ(1), θ(−1), t) be a Bernoulli
model. Let (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t). Then, 1. the
optimal Bayes’ classifier h? : {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1} on this
distribution is of the form:
h?(x) =
{
1, ‖x− θ(1)‖0 ≤ ‖x− θ(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise, (8)
and 2. if k is even, the optimal classification error rate is:
k/2∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i
− 1/2
(
k
k/2
)
(1/2 + t)k/2(1/2− t)k/2 (9)
Otherwise, if k is odd, the classification optimal error rate
would be:
bk/2c∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i, (10)
where k := ‖θ(1) − θ(−1)‖0, which is the number of di-
mensions that θ(1) and θ(−1) do not agree. We call these
dimensions as the “effective dimensions”.
Assumption 1. We assume that for ∀u, v ∈ {−1, 1}d and
‖u′ − θ′(1)‖0 = ‖v′ − θ′(1)‖0, the (0, )-optimal robust
classifier would give the same label to u and v. Note that,
this is a rational assumption because of the symmetry of the
problem.
Theorem 4. Let Bernoulli (θ(1), θ(−1), t) be a Bernoulli
model. Let (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t). Let B0(x) be
the perturbation set. Then, under the assumption 1, 1. the
(0, )-optimal robust classifier h? : {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1}
on this distribution is of the form:
h?(adv)(x) =
{
1, ‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0 ≤ s
−1, otherwise, (11)
where s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} is a threshold, and x′, and θ′(1) are
the restrictions of x, and θ(1) to the effective dimensions,
defined in theorem 3, respectively, and 2. the classification
(0, )-optimal error rate would be:
R
(adv)
0, (h,D) = 1/2
s+∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i+
1/2
k−s+−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i (12)
Theorem 5. Let Bernoulli (θ(1), θ(−1), t) be a Bernoulli
model. Let (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t). Let B∞(x)
be a perturbation set. Then, 1. the (∞, )-optimal robust
classifier h?(adv) : {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1} on this distribution
for  < 1 is of the form:
h?(adv)(x) =
{
1, ‖T (x)− θ(1)‖0 ≤ ‖T (x)− θ(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise,
(13)
where T (x) = (sign(x1), . . . , sign(xd)) and sign(r) is 1
if r ≥ 0 and is −1 otherwise, and 2. the classification
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(∞, )-optimal error rate would be:
R(adv)∞, (h,D) =
{
R(h?, D),  < 1
1/2, otherwise,
(14)
where h? is the optimal Baye’s classification rule.
Remark 1: Note that the effective dimension, k, rather than
the real dimension of the input, appears in the equations for
the optimal classifiers.
Remark 2: For the case of isotropic Gaussian distribution,
for the `2 attack model, maximum allowed adversarial
perturbation, before getting the trivial random chance
adversarial accuracy is half of the `2 distance between
the centers of the two Gaussians. For the mixture of
multi-dimensional Bernoulli distribution, however, for the
`∞ attack model, such a limit is  = 1, which translates to
 = 0.5 for the mixture elements being in {0, 1}. For the
`0 attack, one has to use the final equation of the proof to
find the mentioned limit for epsilon, which is plotted in the
Supplementary Materials G.
Detailed proofs of the theorems in this section are
provided in Supplementary Materials A.
It is notable that, there is some work in the literature
(Bubeck et al., 2018; Garg et al., 2019; Gourdeau et al.,
2019; Mahloujifar & Mahmoody, 2018), which discussed
the computational hardness of adversarial robust learning.
However, none of them considered the optimal case.
6. Conclusion and future work
We demonstrated that the weight initialization plays an im-
portant role in the adversarial learnability of deep models on
larger perturbations. Specifically, weights from an already
robust model on a smaller perturbation size could be an
effective initialization to achieve this goal. In spite of the
promises in the proposed idea, some directions remain un-
studied. We next provide a list of possible future directions
to extend this work:
• In this work, we demonstrated the importance of
weight initialization in the feasibility of adversarial
training on large perturbations. However, more theo-
retical explanation is still essential to better understand
this phenomenon from an optimization perspective, e.g.
explaining the geometry of loss landscape.
• We suggest that the idea behind this method may be
the key to make learning possible on large variance
Gaussian noise data augmentation. This can be used to
improve methods such as the randomized smoothing
(Cohen et al., 2019; Salman et al., 2019) as well.
• We showed that finding the optimal robust classifier
is an NP-hard problem in general. We also showed
that it can be computed for some specific distributions.
However, it would be useful to understand what general
properties of the data distribution make finding the
optimal robust classifier efficiently possible.
Code
You can find our code in: https://github.com/
rohban-lab/Shaeiri_submitted_2020
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Appendices
A. Proofs
Definition 1. PD,p, : The general problem of finding a (p, )-optimal robust classifier on the distribution D, under the
perturbation set Bp(x). An algorithmic solution to this problem would take as input D, p and  and outputs a classifier
h : Rd → L that is (p, )-optimal robust.
Definition 2. QG(V,E): The problem of finding the maximum distance−3 independent set in an unweighted undirected graph
G(V,E). We call a subset of nodes S ⊆ V a distance−d independent set if ∀u1, u2 ∈ S, u1 6= u2 : distG(u1, u2) ≥ d,
where distG(u1, u2) is length of the shortest path between u1 and u2 on the graph G. The goal of this problem is to find a
maximum cardinality distance−3 independent set of graph G(V,E).
Lemma 1. Every instance of QG(V,E) can be reduced to an instance of PD,p, in polynomial time.
Proof. Let |V | = k and consider an order e1, . . . , e(k2) of all possible edges on G(V,E), where each possible edge is of
the form ei = {vj , vl} and connects 2 nodes vj , vl ∈ V, j 6= l. We first construct a set of k points in d =
(
k
2
)
dimensional
space and then D(x, y) be supported on these points. Let M be k × d matrix, which is defined as:
Mi,j :=

0, vi 6∈ ej
λ, ej = {vi, vl} and i > l
−λ, ej = {vi, vl} and i ≤ l,
(15)
and λ is defined for any given p,  ∈ R, p,  > 0 or p =∞ as follows:
λ :=
{

p√2k−4 , p 6=∞
, p =∞. (16)
Note that the `p distance between every pair of rows in M is greater than . Now, based on M , we define a new matrix M ′,
where if the edge ei ∈ E and ei = (vj , vl), we set M ′j,i = |Mj,i| and M ′l,i = |Ml,i|. Note that in the matrix M ′, two rows
whose corresponding vertices are not connected still remain greater than  apart with respect to the `p norm. However, two
rows that are connected in the graph G(V,E) would now have an `p distance of exactly .
Next, let L = {1, 2, . . . , k} be the set of labels. We define discrete probability distributions D : Rd × L → R on points
defined as rows of M ′.
D(x = M ′i , y = j) = 1/k × I(i = j) (17)
To find a (p, )-optimal robust classifier on the mentionedD, which is supported on a finite set of pointsX := {M ′1, . . . ,M ′k},
we have to solve the following optimization problem:
arg min
h:Rd→L
R(adv)p, (h, p) (18)
= arg min
h:Rd→L
Ex,y ∼D
{
I(∃δ ∈ Bp : h(x+ δ) 6= y)
}
= arg min
h:Rd→L
∑
xi∈X, 1≤yj≤k
I
(∃δ ∈ Bp : h(x+ δ) 6= yj)D(xi, yj)
= arg max
h:Rd→L
∑
xi∈X, 1≤yj≤k
I
(∀δ ∈ Bp : h(xi + δ) = yj)D(xi, yj)
By our construction of D, this would be equivalent to:
arg max
h:Rd→L
∑
xi∈X
I
(∀δ ∈ Bp : h(xi + δ) = yi) (19)
= arg max
h:Rd→L
∑
xi∈X
I
(∀δ ∈ Bp : h(xi + δ) = i)
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Note that by our construction of X , there is an edge between vi and vj iff ‖xj − xi‖p ≤ . Hence, this optimization is
equivalent to:
arg max
h:V→L
∑
vi∈V
I (∀u ∈ neighbors(vi) : h(u) = i and h(vi) = i) , (20)
where neighbors(v) is the set of all nodes connected to the v in the graph G. Note that for the i-th term in the sum to be one,
(1) vi should be labeled as i by h, and (2) all neighbors of vi in the graph G(V,E) should be labeled as i. Therefore, for
both the i-th and j-th term in the sum to be one, they should have a graph distance of at least 3. Also, if vi and vj have a
graph distance of at least 3 then, they can both be one in the sum. As a result, the last optimization would be equivalent to:
arg max
U⊆V
∑
u∈U
I(∀v ∈ U, v 6= u : distG(u, v) ≥ 3). (21)
Therefore, the last optimization would equivalently find the set of vertices U ⊆ V with maximum cardinality such that,
all selected vertices have a distance of at least 3 in the graph. As a result, the problem of finding a (p, )-optimal robust
classifier on D would yield a solution to the maximum distance−3 independent set for the input graph G(V,E).
Theorem 1. The problem of finding the (p, )-optimal robust classifier on the distribution D, PD,p,, is an NP-hard
problem.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 1, the maximum distance−3 independent set problem can be reduced to PD,p, in polynomial
time. The former is a well-known NP-hard problem, which implies that PD,p, would be NP-hard too.
Remark 1. For the special case of p = 0 in Lemma 1, one can consider  =
(
k
2
)− 1 = d− 1 and define the k × d matrix
M as: Mi,j := (i − 1) × d + j. Note that the `0 distance between every pair of rows in M is exactly d. Now, based on
M , we can again define a new matrix M ′, where if the edge ei ∈ E and ei = (vj , vl), we set M ′j,i = min(Mj,i,Ml,i) and
M ′l,i = min(Mj,i,Ml,i). Note that in the matrix M
′, two rows whose corresponding vertices are not connected still remain
exactly d apart with respect to the `0 norm. However, two rows that are connected in the graph G(V,E) would now have an
`0 distance of exactly d− 1.
Remark 2. The most general case of the perturbation set can be defined by using a relation Re ⊆ Rd × Rd. Let x ∈ Rd
then, the perturbation set is defined as: B(x) :=
{
x′ ∈ Rd : (x, x′) ∈ Re}. In this general case making a relation Re
using graph G(V,E), and specifying coordinates of the points is trivial.
Theorem 2. Let (x|y) ∼ N(µy, σ2I), and y ∈ {−1, 1}with equal probabilities, then assuming that the (2, )-optimal robust
classifier has a continuous decision boundary, f(x) = 2I(w>x ≥ 0)−1 is (2, )-robust , wherew = µ1−µ−1. Furthermore,
the optimal Bayes and optimal robust classification error rates are Φ
(
−‖µ1−µ−1‖2
2σ
)
, and Φ
(
−‖µ1−µ−1‖2+2
2σ
)
, respectively,
where Φ is the cumulative distribution function for the standard normal distribution.
Proof. A binary classifier can be expressed as h : Rd → {−1, 1}. We aim to find the optimal robust classifier h?(adv):
h?(adv) = arg min
h
EX,Y
{
max
‖δ‖2≤
|h(X + δ)− Y |
}
, (22)
where Y is the true label of the data point X .
Let f1 and f−1 denote the conditional densities of X given Y , N(µ1, σ2I) and N(µ−1, σ2I), accordingly. Then, we have:
P(Y = i|X = x) = fi(x)
f1(x) + f−1(x)
, i ∈ {1,−1}, (23)
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and we get:
EX,Y
{
max
‖δ‖2≤
|h(X + δ)− Y |
}
= EX
{
f1(x)
f1(x) + f−1(x)
max
‖δ‖2≤
|h(x+ δ)− 1| +
f−1(x)
f1(x) + f−1(x)
max
‖δ‖2≤
|h(x+ δ) + 1|
}
=
1
2
∫
Rd
(f1(x) max‖δ‖2≤
|h(x+ δ)− 1| + f−1(x) max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x+ δ) + 1|)dx
(24)
Definition 3. Decision Boundary of classifier h is defined as
DB(h) :=
{
x | ∃C > 0 ∀0 <  ≤ C, ∃u ∈ Rd, u 6= 0, ‖u‖2 ≤ , h(x+ u) 6= h(x)
}
(25)
In what follows, we focus only on the candidate classifiers that have a continuous decision boundary.
Definition 4. β(x) is defined as the set of points that are within `2 ball of radius  around x, excluding the outer boundary.
Also, the critical region of h, denoted as CR(h), is defined as the set of points that can be misclassified by adding a
perturbation of length no more than .
CR(h) :=
{
x | ∃δ ∈ Rd, ‖δ‖2 ≤ , h(x) 6= h(x+ δ)
}
(26)
Lemma 2. CR(h) =
⋃
x∈DB(h)
β(x)
Proof. Suppose that x ∈ CR(h). Therefore, there exists δ such that ‖δ‖2 ≤  and h(x) 6= h(x+ δ). Since the label of the
data points, x and x+ δ are different and as we assumed that DB(h) is continuous, there must exist k ∈ (0, 1) such that
x+ kδ ∈ DB(h). Note that
‖x+ kδ − x‖2 = ‖kδ‖2 = k‖δ‖2 < ‖δ‖2 ≤  =⇒ x+ kδ ∈ β(x),
and according to Definition 4, CR(h) ⊆ ⋃
x∈DB(h)
β(x).
Now suppose that x ∈ ⋃
x∈DB(h)
β(x). Then, there exists x0 ∈ DB(h) such that x ∈ β(x0). But note that
x ∈ β(x0) =⇒ ‖x− x0‖2 < 
x0 ∈ DB(h) =⇒ ∃u : ‖u‖2 ≤ − ‖x− x0‖2, h(x0 + u) 6= h(x0)
As a result, ‖x− (x0 + u)‖2 ≤ ‖x− x0‖2 + ‖u‖2 ≤ .
Note that as ‖x− x0‖2 < , h(x) 6= h(x+ (x0 − x)) = h(x0), if h(x0) 6= h(x), x ∈ CR(h). Otherwise,
h(x0) = h(x), h(x0 + u) 6= h(x0) =⇒ h(x0 + u) 6= h(x),
‖x− (x0 + u)‖2 ≤  =⇒ x ∈ CR(h).
So, in both cases,
⋃
x∈DB(h)
β(x) ⊆ CR(h).
According to the Definition 4, for all x ∈ CR(h), there exist two points like x0 = x, x1 within  distance of x, such that
h(x0) = 1, h(x1) = −1. Therefore, max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x+ δ)− 1| = max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x+ δ) + 1| = 2. As a result, we have
1
2
∫
CR(h)
(f1(x) max‖δ‖2≤
|h(x + δ) − 1| + f−1(x) max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x + δ) + 1|)dx =
∫
CR(h)
(f1(x) + f−1(x))dx. (27)
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Definition 5. Safe Region of the class i, denoted as SRi(h), is defined as the set of points that are labeled as i by the
classifier h, and cannot be misclassified when a perturbation of size less than or equal to  is added.
According to the definition above, for all x0 ∈ SRi(h), we get
∀δ ‖δ‖2 ≤  h(x0) = h(x0 + δ) = i.
As a result, for such x0, max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x0 + δ) − 1| = |i − 1| and max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x0 + δ) + 1| = |i + 1|. Therefore, the
value of
1
2
∫
SRi(h)
f1(x) max‖δ‖2≤
|h(x+ δ)− 1| + f−1(x) max‖δ‖2≤ |h(x+ δ) + 1| dx
for i = 1,−1 is ∫
SR1(h)
f−1(x)dx, and
∫
SR−1(h)
f1(x)dx, (28)
respectively.
As Rd = CR(h)
⋃
SR1(h)
⋃
SR−1(h), and according to Eqs. 24, 27, and 28, we have
EX,Y
{
max
‖δ‖2≤
|h(x+ δ)− y|
}
=
∫
CR(h)
(f1(x) + f−1(x))dx +
∫
SR1(h)
f−1(x)dx
+
∫
SR−1(h)
f1(x)dx = 2−
∫
SR1(h)
f1(x)dx−
∫
SR−1(h)
f−1(x)dx (29)
So the solution to optimal  robust classifier in Eq. 26, is equivalent to the solution of
arg max
h
∫
SR1(h)
f1(x)dx+
∫
SR−1(h)
f−1(x)dx (30)
Let E be a unit vector parallel to the line passing means of the normal distributions. That is, E := µ1−µ−1‖µ1−µ−1‖2 . Define
SR′i(h) = {x− iE | x ∈ SRi(h)} and f ′i as the density of the normal distributions with mean of µ1− iE and covariance
σ2I , for i = 1,−1. Then, we have∫
SR1(h)
f1(x)dx+
∫
SR−1(h)
f−1(x)dx
=
∫
SR′1(h)
f1(x+ E)dx+
∫
SR′−1(h)
f−1(x− E)dx
=
∫
SR′1(h)
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
SR′−1(h)
f ′−1(x)dx
(31)
Lemma 3. SR′1(h)
⋂
SR′−1(h) = ∅.
Proof. Otherwise, there exists x ∈ SR′1(h), x ∈ SR′−1(h), such that
x− E ∈ SR−1(h) ‖E‖2==⇒ h(x− E) = h(x) = −1
x+ E ∈ SR1(h) ‖E‖2==⇒ h(x+ E) = h(x) = 1,
which is a contradiction.
So every x ∈ Rd, belongs to at most one of SR′1(h) and SR′−1(h) and so, SR′−1(h) ⊆ Rd\SR′1(h). This implies that∫
SR′1(h)
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
SR−1(h)
f ′−1(x)dx ≤
∫
SR′1(h)
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
f ′−1(x)dx (32)
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Now, let DB? be the hyperplane perpendicular to E, h? be the classifier whose decision boundary is DB?, and h?(µ1) =
1, h?(µ−1) = −1. Then
∀x s.t. h?(x) = i, ‖x− µi‖2 ≤ ‖x− µ−i‖2
As f ′1 and f
′
−1 are densities of the normal distributions with the same covariance, for  less than half of the distance between
µ1 and µ−1, if ‖x−µ1‖2 ≤ ‖x−µ−1‖2, then f ′1(x) ≥ f ′−1(x). Further, if ‖x−µ1‖2 ≥ ‖x−µ−1‖2, then f ′1(x) ≤ f ′−1(x).
Now define Ci = {x|h?(x) = i}. By definition, C1
⋃
C−1 = Rd. Then, ∀x ∈ Ci, f ′i(x) ≥ f ′−i(x). For any classifier,
we have ∫
SR′1(h)
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
f ′−1(x)dx
=
∫
SR′1(h)
⋂
C1
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
SR′1(h)
⋂
C−1
f ′1(x)dx
+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
⋂
C1
f ′−1(x)dx+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
⋂
C−1
f ′−1(x)dx
≤
∫
SR′1(h)
⋂
C1
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
SR′1(h)
⋂
C−1
f ′−1(x)dx
+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
⋂
C1
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
Rd\SR′1(h)
⋂
C−1
f ′−1(x)dx
=
∫
C1
f ′1(x)dx+
∫
C−1
f ′−1(x)dx
(33)
Finally, note that for the classifier h?, the RHS and LHS of the above inequality are equal. Therefore, h? is an optimal 
robust classifier and the optimal robust classification error would clearly be Φ
(
−‖µ1−µ−1‖2+2
2σ
)
.
Remark 3. (Ilyas et al., 2019) has studied the problem of the optimal robust classifier on a binary classification task where
data is driven from Gaussian distributions. However, they have a strong assumption on the hypothesis space. Specifically,
they focused on linear classifiers. Here, we do not assume anything about the hypothesis space other than continuity of the
decision boundary.
Fact 1. Assume that θ(1) and θ(−1) are different in k ≤ d dimensions. We call k the “effective dimensionality” and we get
k = ‖θ(1) − θ(−1)‖0. We can restrict all x, θ(1), and θ(−1) only to the k effective dimensions. We call x′, θ′(1), and θ′(−1)
the restriction of these vectors to the “effective dimensions”. Similarly, we call x′′, θ′′(1), and θ′′(−1) the restriction of these
vectors to “non-effective dimensions”.
Note that θ′(1) = −θ′(−1) and θ′′(1) = θ′′(−1), and
‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0 + ‖x′ − θ′(−1)‖0 = k. (34)
Theorem 3. Let’s assume that (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli (θ(1), θ(−1), t). Then, 1. the optimal Bayes’ classifier h? : {−1, 1}d →
{−1, 1} on this distribution is of the form:
h?(x) =
{
1, ‖x− θ(1)‖0 ≤ ‖x− θ(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise, (35)
and 2. if k is even, the optimal classification error rate is:
k/2∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i − 1/2
(
k
k/2
)
(1/2 + t)k/2(1/2− t)k/2 (36)
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Otherwise, if k is odd, the classification optimal error rate would be:
bk/2c∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i, (37)
where k := ‖θ(1) − θ(−1)‖0.
Proof. 1. We start with the equation of the Baye’s optimal classifier as an optimal classifier on the given distribution:
h?(x) = arg max
y∈{−1,1}
D(x, y) (38)
= arg max
y∈{−1,1}
1/2× (1/2 + t)k−‖x−θ(y)‖0(1/2− t)‖x−θ(y)‖0
= arg max
y∈{−1,1}
(1/2 + t)k−‖x−θ
(y)‖0(1/2− t)‖x−θ(y)‖0
= arg max
y∈{−1,1}
(1/2 + t)k−‖x
′−θ′(y)‖0(1/2− t)‖x′−θ′(y)‖0
That is:
h?(x) =

1, (1/2 + t)k−‖x
′−θ′(1)‖0(1/2− t)‖x′−θ′(1)‖0 ≥
(1/2 + t)k−‖x
′−θ′(−1)‖0(1/2− t)‖x′−θ′(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise
(39)
By using the Eq. 34 in the above classification rule:
h?(x) =

1, (1/2 + t)k−‖x
′−θ′(1)‖0(1/2− t)‖x′−θ′(1)‖0 ≥
(1/2 + t)‖x
′−θ′(1)‖0(1/2− t)k−‖x′−θ′(1)‖0
−1, otherwise
(40)
By rearranging this rule, we finally arrive at:
h?(x) =
{
1, ‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0 ≤ k/2
−1, otherwise, (41)
which by applying the Eq. 34 again is the same as:
h?(x) =
{
1, ‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0 ≤ ‖x′ − θ′(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise (42)
And finally:
h?(x) =
{
1, ‖x− θ(1)‖0 ≤ ‖x− θ(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise (43)
2. The classification error rate for h? can now be calculated as follows:
R(h?, D) = Ex,y ∼D {I(h?(x) 6= y)} (44)
=
∑
x,y
I(h?(x) 6= y)×D(x, y)
=
∑
x:h?(x)=1
D(x,−1) +
∑
x:h?(x)=−1
D(x, 1)
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By plugging in h? and D(x, y), we would get:
= 1/2
∑
x:‖x′−θ′(1)‖0≤k/2
(1/2 + t)‖x
′−θ′(1)‖0(1/2− t)k−‖x′−θ′(1)‖0
+ 1/2
∑
x:‖x′−θ′(1)‖0>k/2
(1/2 + t)k−‖x
′−θ′(1)‖0(1/2− t)‖x′−θ′(1)‖0 (45)
If k is even, this would simplify to:
1/2
k/2∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i + 1/2
k∑
i=k/2+1
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)k−i(1/2− t)i (46)
=
k/2∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i − 1/2
(
k
k/2
)
(1/2 + t)k/2(1/2− t)k/2 (47)
Otherwise, if k is odd, the error rate would be:
bk/2c∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i (48)
Remark 4. Note that the final equations of the optimal classification error rate for this distribution can be simply rewritten
by using the Hypergeometric functions.
Theorem 4. Let (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t). Let B0(x) be the perturbation set. Then, under the assumption 1, 1. the
(0, )-optimal robust classifier h? : {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1} on this distribution is of the form:
h?(adv)(x) =
{
1, ‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0 ≤ s
−1, otherwise, (49)
where s ∈ {0, 1, ..., k} is a threshold, and x′, and θ′(1) are the restrictions of x, and θ(1) to the effective dimensions, defined
in theorem 3, respectively, and 2. the classification (0, )-optimal error rate would be:
R
(adv)
0, (h,D) = 1/2
s+∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i + 1/2
k−s+−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i (50)
Proof. 1. Let k be an effective dimension according to Fact 1. Let h be a (0, )-optimal robust classifier. Let S1, S−1 ⊂
{−1, 1}d denote all the points that are assigned to the classes 1 and −1 by h, and have `0 distance of no more than
⌈
k
2
⌉
to
θ′(1) and θ′(−1), respectively. Further, let x?1 := arg maxx∈S1 ‖x− θ′(1)‖0, and x?−1 := arg maxx∈S−1 ‖x− θ′(−1)‖0. And
also, let d1 = ‖x?1 − θ′(1)‖0 and, d−1 = ‖x?−1 − θ′(−1)‖0. We claim that for such an optimal robust classifier h, all points
x ∈ {−1, 1}d, which ‖x− θ′(1)‖0 ≤ d1 can be labelled as 1, and all points x ∈ {−1, 1}d, which ‖x− θ′(−1)‖0 ≤ d−1 can
be labelled as −1. To show this, consider a set of points S¯1 = {x ∈ {−1, 1}d | h(x) = −1, ‖x − θ′(1)‖0 ≤ d1}. Then,
by changing their labels to +1: 1. We will not destroy the robustness of any points in S1, because they are all labelled as
+1 by the h. 2. We will not destroy the robustness of the other points in {−1, 1}d − S1, because in fact x?1 and all points
T1 = {x ∈ {−1, 1}d : ‖x − θ′(1)‖0 = d1} have the same label +1 using the assumption 1. Also, `0 distance between
S¯1 and {−1, 1}d − S1 are greater or equal than the `0 distance between T1 and {−1, 1}d − S1. 3. Because for S¯1 the
probability of being +1 is greater than being −1, this would yield a classifier that does not have a worse adversarial error
rate compared to h. So, overall we can change these points label and similarly the points in S¯−1 without loss of accuracy.
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Therefore, the (0, )-optimal robust classifier basically thresholds ‖x′ − θ′(1)‖0. Notably, the thresholds can be either 0 or k,
which means that all points are labeled to either +1 or −1. The minimum adversarial error for p = 0 and  is given by:
min
0≤s≤k
1/2
s+∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i + 1/2
k−s+−1∑
i=0
(
k
i
)
(1/2 + t)i(1/2− t)k−i (51)
For specifying the exact threshold, one can evaluate the adversarial error rate using a different value of k (Supplementary
Figure in Sec. G).
Lemma 4. Let Bp(x) be a perturbation set, and h : Rd → L be a classifier. Then, R(adv)p, (h,D) ≥ R(h,D).
Proof.
R(adv)p, (h,D) = Ex,y ∼ D
{
I(∃δ ∈ Bp : h(x+ δ) 6= y)
}
(52)
It is obvious that B0p(x) ⊆ Bp(x) then:
Ex,y ∼ D
{
I(∃δ ∈ Bp : h(x+ δ) 6= y)
} ≥ Ex,y ∼ D {I(∃δ ∈ B0p : h(x+ δ) 6= y)} (53)
= Ex,y ∼ D {I(h(x) 6= y)} = R(h,D) (54)
Theorem 5. Let Bernoulli (θ(1), θ(−1), t) be a Bernoulli model. Let (x, y) ∼ Bernoulli(θ(1), θ(−1), t). Let B∞(x) be a
perturbation set. Then, 1. the (∞, )-optimal robust classifier h?(adv) : {−1, 1}d → {−1, 1} on this distribution for  < 1
is of the form:
h?(adv)(x) =
{
1, ‖T (x)− θ(1)‖0 ≤ ‖T (x)− θ(−1)‖0
−1, otherwise, (55)
where T (x) = (sign(x1), . . . , sign(xd)) and sign(r) is 1 if r ≥ 0 and is −1 otherwise, and 2. the classification (∞, )-
optimal error rate would be:
R(adv)∞, (h,D) =
{
R(h?, D),  < 1
1/2, otherwise,
(56)
where h? is the optimal Baye’s classification rule.
Proof. Note that if  < 1, no `∞ attack could change the sign of any dimension of x. Therefore, applying the function T
would recover the original clean input x. Therefore, the adversarial error rate of h? ◦ T would be the same as the error rate
of h?. But adversarial error rate of any classifier is lower bounded by optimal Bayes error rate. Here, the function h? ◦ T
achieves this lower bound. Hence, this classifier should be (∞, )-optimally robust. If  ≥ 1, we can simply map all points
of the distribution to
−→
0 . Therefore even the (∞, )-optimal robust classifier can not have better than random accuracy,
which is 1/2 here.
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B. Different Settings for the Adversarial Training
For the MNIST dataset, we tested a variety of settings to adversarially train a model on  = 0.4. However, it seems that
training a robust network on 0.4 is not feasible when weights are randomly initialized. It is notable that this fact was also
observed by (Chen et al., 2017).
1. We test (Glorot & Bengio, 2010) initialization and all other settings are the same as the main text.
2. We test different settings of optimizers, specifically, SGD with the learning rate from {0.1, 0.01, 0.001} with and
without momentum and Adam (Kingma & Ba, 2014) with the learning rate from {0.1, 0.01, 0.001} and all other
settings are the same as the main text.
3. Also, we try to change the batch size from {16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 512, 104} and all other settings are the same as the
main text.
4. We test standard ResNet-18 architecture (He et al., 2015b) with different settings of optimizers as mentioned below.
We believe that this model can cover needed model capacity as discussed in (Madry et al., 2017).
5. We test different settings of PGD (Madry et al., 2017) by using different learning rates and step sizes and all other
settings are the same as the main text. It is notable that by using FGSM, we can successfully train a model on  = 0.4.
However, the model indeed suffers from the gradient obfuscation (Athalye et al., 2018).
C. Evaluation Details
When we use the training PGD as mentioned in the main text on the epsilon = 0.4 model, the attack leads to about 89%
adversarial accuracy. Also, when we use the training PGD as mentioned in the main text on the epsilon = 0.5 model, the
attack leads to about 80% adversarial accuracy!
1. FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014) is not a stronger attack than PGD (Madry et al., 2017). However, verifying that PGD
is always stronger than FGSM on our models is essential. We verified that adversarial accuracy is always lower using
training PGD on both models.
2. Unbounded attacks should always lead to zero accuracies. We verify that by using the training PGD but in the
unbounded setting, we can make an attack, which leads to zero accuracies on both models.
3. PGD with random offset should not affect the model adversarial accuracy significantly. As the random offset is included
in training PGD, attacking the model using random offset does not decrease the adversarial accuracy on models.
4. Using many random restarts should not effect model adversarial accuracy significantly. We used training PGD with 10
random restarts. However, we did not observe any significant changes in the adversarial accuracy of both models.
5. Using PGD with more steps should not affect adversarial accuracy significantly. We used the training PGD with 2000
steps as an attack but it did not affect models’ adversarial accuracy significantly.
6. By increasing the magnitude of the attack, adversarial accuracy should monotonically decrease. We verify that by
using the training PGD and increasing the allowed magnitude of perturbations, the adversarial accuracy of both models
monotonically decreases.
7. The targeted PGD attack should not significantly change the adversarial accuracy. We verify that by using the PGD
targeted attack with the same setting as in the training PGD, and considering the highest loss between 10 possible
classes targets for each image (Gowal et al., 2019). Still, no significant changes are observed using this new attack on
both models.
8. A brute force attack should be an effective attack on the model. We use a batch of size 128 and 108 samples of
perturbation for each image. Specifically, we use Bernoulli distribution for sampling the perturbations. Each pixel of
an image can change either − or +. We verify that this method also is not effective in attacking both models.
9. We also verify that the minimum needed size of distortion for decreasing the adversarial accuracy of models to zero, is
higher in both models in comparison to the base model, assuming the training PGD as an attack.
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10. We also try to decrease our models’ adversarial accuracy by using the black-box attack ZOO (Chen et al., 2017).
Specifically, we used the default parameters in the art library (Nicolae et al., 2018). But this attack is not also effective
on both models. Here, we note that indeed being sure about the effect of this attack needs more hyper parameters
tuning.
11. Black box attacks should not outperform white-box attacks. We also verify our models’ adversarial accuracy on
black-box attacks is not lower than the reported adversarial accuracy. Specifically, for the black box attack, we used the
training PGD on the model robust to the adversarial perturbations of size 0.3.
12. We also propose a new attack which we call “semi-black box”. In this attack, we used the base model for training on
perturbations of sizes 0.4 and 0.5, as a model for generation of the adversarial examples. We used the same setting as
in the black-box attacks. However, again this new attack is also not effective.
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D. Supplementary Figures for the Proposed Method
Figure 8. Training adversarial loss against the epoch number for various epsilons in the MNIST dataset. Adversarial training fails to
decrease the training adversarial loss on epsilon greater than≈ 0.35. However, training such models is feasible using extended adversarial
training.
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Figure 9. Training adversarial loss against the epoch number for various epsilons in the CIFAR10 dataset. Adversarial training fails to
decrease the training adversarial loss on epsilon greater than ≈ 16
255
. However, training such models is feasible using extended adversarial
training.
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E. Omitted Figures for the Convergence of Adversarial Training
Figure 10. The difference of training adversarial loss and `2 distance of weights in two consecutive epochs. These figures empirically
indicate the convergence of adversarial training.
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F. Omitted Figure for the Mode Connectivity
Figure 11. When initialized on weights of an already adversarially trained model with epsilon = 0.3, `(α) could be better approximated
by a convex function. Here, for computing the adversarial loss we used the PGD with learning rate = 0.005 and 200 steps. This PGD is
more accurate than the PGD used for producing a similar figure in the main text. As a result, the function could be better approximated by
a convex function.
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G. Omitted Figure for the Theory Part
Figure 12. Evaluating the final formula of `0 on the multi-dimensional Bernoulli distribution against different hyper-parameter values for
k = 50 and t = 0.30.
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H. Omitted Figures for Interpretability
A DCB
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A B C D
Figure 13. (A): Samples from MNIST. (B) The loss gradient (saliency map) with respect to the perturbed input (of epsilon = 0.3) that
is obtained from the model trained on epsilon = 0.3 (Right) and the model that is trained on epsilon from 0.3 to 0.4 (Left). (C) The
perturbation (of size epsilon = 0.45) for the corresponding models in (B). (D) Left: the original image. Right: the perturbations that are
obtained from the model trained on epsilon from 0.3 to 0.5, based on the attack obtained from the actual gradient that is mentioned in Sec.
3.3. Overall, training on larger perturbations leads to improved interpretability of both the model and the attacks.
